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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
J. GOLDEN BARTON MOTOR COM~ 
PANY, INCORPORATED, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CALVIN D. JACKSON, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 
6871 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATE.MENT OF THE CASE 
This action was commenced on December 20, 195:7, 
for speciHc performance of an alleged contract whereby 
the defendant, CALVIN D. JACKSON, according to the 
claim of the complaint ~ntered into a written agreement with 
the plaintiff, J. GOLDEN BARTON MOTOR COMPANY, 
INCORPORATED, to purchase a new Mercury Automo-
bile from plaintiff and gave plaintiff che.cks in the sums 
of $500.00 .and $3,680.00 respectively. The auto·mobile was 
never delivered ·to the defendant an.d he stopped payment 
upon the $500.00 c'heck. The defendant answe·red denying 
that there was .a contract between the parties. On . March 
8, 1958, the deposition of the defendant was taken befo·re 
Lois P. Crowder in the office of the plaintiff's attorney. 
On June 10, 1958, the plaintiff made a written motion for 
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summary judgment, in favor of the plaintiff, of forfeiture 
o.f the sum of $500.00 for nonperformance of the contract by 
the defendant, and the defendant made an oral motion 
for summary judgment of dismissal. These motions were 
argued and at the request of the court, counsel presented 
written memoranda of authorities. On December 15, 1958, 
the C·ourt made and entered its Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law and Judgment in favor of the plaintiff for 
the sum of $500.00, as a forfeiture of liquidated damages. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The only evidence before the court consists of the de-
fendant's deposition and four exhibits identified therein. 
The essential facts as disclosed by these sources are as 
follows: 
Calvin Jackson, the defendant, went to the plaintiff's 
place of business and during a conversation asked Dean 
Roberts, the plaintiff's salesman, how much the defendant 
could purchase a 1.\/Iercury Parklane for. The salesman said, 
"For $500.00 I can get you that ~ar for about $100.00 a 
month for 36 months." (Deposition, Page 13) The defend-
ant assented to this and at the· request of plaintiff's sales-
man, executed and delivered his check in the sum of $500.00. 
(plaintiff's exhibit ''2") and signed an invoice and order, 
(plaintiff's exhibit "1") whereupon the price of the .auto-
mobile had been stated as $4,080.00, and on the left..Jhand 
side had been written, "payable in 36 installments of $100.00." 
(Deposition, Page 13 and 14) The salesman said th:at before 
this could become a contract he would have to have it con-
firmed by the sales manager. He then showed the contract 
to the sale·s manager, who wrote over the figure "$100.00" 
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the figure "112" and some odd cents. He brought this back 
li:· to Jackson and said, "this will have to be $112.00." (Deposi-
!f~ tion, Page 14) Jackson said, "well, I guess that will be 
alright," but did not, in writing, acknowledge any change in 
t· the contract and no new contract was drawn. (Deposition, 
Pages 19, 20, 21 and 24) After this, however, the salesman 
went back to the sales manager and .came. back to Jackson 
saying, "Dean made a mistake. The. payments will have to 
be $118.00 a month." (Deposition, Page 14) Jackson said, 
"I can't make those payments." Meanwhile, without Jack-
sons authorization and over his signature, the plaintiff's 
ag~nt had writte·n over the figures previously placed th-ere-
upon the figure., "118.74." When the defendant refused to 
accept these payments, the plaintiff's agents insisted that 
they were going to run the contract . through Commercial 
Credit for financing upon those terms. The defendant 
insisted that he could not meet these terms and that he 
was not willing to meet them and stated that he would 
contact Continental Bank and see what he could do about 
financing the automobile. (Deposition., Pages 14 and 15) 
He gave his check to the plaintiff for $3,680.00, upon which 
he wrote a statement to the effect that it was to be. cashed 
or used only when or if the automobile should be financed. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit "3") The plaintiff's agents then wrote. 
an additional provision upon the invoice and order form 
to the following effect: "Cal has alternative for financing 
from Continental Bank. $100.00 more if he does finance." 
(Deposition, Pages 20 and 21) Thereupon the defendant left 
the plaintiff's place of business .and on the f.oUowing day 
s~opped payment upon the $500.00 check. (Deposition, 
Page 18.) 
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The alleged contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit "1") upon 
which the plaintiff's claim is based is on a printed form 
and contains the following written provisions: 
Purchaser's N arne: Cal Jackson 
Please enter my order for used Parklane 2 Dr. Hardtop 
Cash Selling Price $4,000.00 
We will get 
1958 Plates 
Sales Tax 
License & Transfer of Title 
Total Cash Selling Price 
Payable in 36" Installments of "$118.74 
Additional Information: 
Cal has alternative for financing 
from Continental Bank. 
$100 more if he does finance. 
Deposit herewith 
Unpaid Cash Price 
Balance 
By lsi George Karoulis 
$ 80.00 
$ 6.00 
$4,080.00 
$ 500.00 
$3,580.00 
(Sales Manager or Officer of the Company) 
The figure "$118.74" is obviously written over some 
other figure which by the handwriting has become iiiegible. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
NO CONTRACT WAS EVER FORMED BETWEEN 
THE PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT. 
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POINT II 
EVEN IF THE PARTIES HAD FORMED A BIND-
ING CONTRACT IT WAS, BY ITS TERMS, CONDI-
TIONAL AND THE CONDITIONS UPON WHICH IT 
DEPENDED HAD NOT BEEN PERFORME.D; THERE-
FORE, SUCH CONTRACT IS UNENFORCEABLE. 
POINT III 
EVEN ASSUMING AN UNCONDITIONAL CON-
TRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND A BREACH 
OF THE SAID CONTRACT, THE PLAINTIFF 
SHOWED NO DAMAGES FOR SUCH BREACH., AND 
THERE IS NO GROUND SHOWN FOR THE FOR-
FEITURE OF $500.00 AS LIQUIDATED DAMAGES 
THEREFOR. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
NO CONTRACT WAS EVER FORMED BETWEEN 
THE PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT. 
It is fundamental in the law of contracts that fot" the 
formation of a val~d contract there must be a mutual assent 
or meeting of the minds. (12 Am. Jur. 515.) 
A contract is not made so long as in the contemplation 
of both parties thereto something tetnains to be done to 
establish contract relations. (12 Am. Jur. 519.) 
A qualified or conditional acceptance does not make a 
binldirtg contract and destroys the original offer so that 
a later unqualified acceptance cannot form a contract. 
(12 Am. Jur. 543, Section 53.) 
Where a portion of a contract relatirlg to the terms of 
payment is left for future determination, the c:orttract is 
incomplete and no action premised thereon is maintainable. 
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(HIWAY MOTOR COMPANY VS. SERVICE MOTOR 
COMPANY, 68 Utah, 65, 249 Pac. 133.) 
In the present case, it is impossible to determine from 
the evidence the price which was to be paid for this 
automobile. It could be $4,100.00, $4,080.00, $4,086.00, 
$4,180.00, $4,186.00, $4,774.64, or any one of several other 
different prices computed by different combinations of the 
plaintiff's contradictory figures. 
If, as alleged in the complaint, there was a contract, 
when and how was it formed? At the time when Jackson 
had signed the invoice and order and delivered his check 
in the sum of $500.00, there was no contract between the 
parties because this proposal had not yet been accepted by 
Barton Motor's authorized agent. At this point it consti-
tuted only a unilateral offer upon the part of Jackson. 
At the time when the figure $100.00 was changed by 
the plaintiff's agent to $112.00 there was no contract be-
tween the parties because while Jackson indicated his assent 
to this change, he did not actually accept it and this was 
later withdrawn by the plaintiff's sales manager by writ-
ing over this figure the figure "$118.74." 
After this higher figure was inserted, there never 
was any assent upon Jackson's part to the terms of the 
altered instrument. Quite to the contrary, the evidence 
clearly shows that this proposal was persistenly refused 
by the appellant. 
The only authority cited by the plaintiff is its Mem-
orandum of- Authorities and the one on which the district 
court apparently based its decision is the case of JENSEN'S 
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USED CARS vs. JAME;S T. RICH, (7 U, 2d 276, 323 Pac 
2nd, 259.) The facts in the J ense.n case as stated in the 
opinion of this court are as follows : 
"On August 12th or 13th the plaintiff's agent deUvered 
a used car to the defendant who gave the agent a $200.00 
check and signed a conditional sales contract in blank. 
This contract was not used. On August 17th the defendant 
stopped payment on the check. Nevertheless, on tbe next 
day, August 18th, the defendant signed· another conditional 
sales contract that contained clear, c~omplete terms including 
the price. The defendant admitted all this. He has paid 
nothing. After havin.g possessio·n of the car three months, 
it was picked up because of the defendant's default in 
payment." (Emphasis ours) 
Certainly the Jensen case is not authority for the 
fact that a contract had been formed between the parties 
in the present cas.e. There, as shown by the above state-
ment of facts, while a blank contract was signe·ci orginally, 
this contract was not used an.d a later clear and complete 
contract was signed. Under the evidence here before the 
court it is impossible t.o determine e.ven the price for which 
the automobile was to be sold. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THE PARTIES HAD FORMED A BIND-
ING CONTRACT IT WAS, BY ITS TERMS, CONDI-
TIONAL AND TH.E CONDITIONS UPON WHICH IT 
DEPENDED HAD NOT BE.EN PERFORMED; THERE-
FORE, SUCH CONTRACT IS UNFORCEABLE. 
If a contract was ever formed between the parties, it 
would have to be by the delivery of the defe-ndant's check 
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to the plaintiff in the sum of $3,680.00, and its acceptance by 
the plaintiff. The check referred to (Plaintiff's Exhibit "3") 
' has written upon it a statement to the effect that "this check 
must be held until and if I secure a loan for the amount 
and release this to be cashed." At this point in the nego-
tiations ,the plaintiff's agent wrote upon the invoice and 
order under which it claims, the words, "Cal has alternative 
for financing from Continental Bank, $100 more if he does 
finance." Jackson did not subscribe this alteration in the 
contract nor any of the previous ones. 
If at this point a contract was formed between the 
parties then such contract was subject to the terms and con-
ditions stated, the principal one of which was the condition 
that Jackson obtain financing from Continental Bank upon 
the automobile. This condition was never performed. 
SECTION 60-1-11, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, 
which is one of the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act 
provides as follows: 
"EFFECT OF CONDITIONS (1) Where the obliga-
tion of either party to a contract to seU or a sale is subject 
to any condition which is not performed, such party may 
refuse to proceed with the contract or sale, or he may 
waive performance of the condition. If the. other party 
has promised that the condition should happen or be per-
formed, such first mentioned party may also treat the. non-
performance of the condition as a breach of warranty"' 
There is no evidence of any promise or undertaking 
upon the part of the defendant to finance the automobile 
and the writing upon the invoice and order form is entirely 
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that of the plaintiff's agents and should be construed most 
strongly against the plaintiff. 
POINT III 
EVEN ASSUMING AN UNCONDITIONAL CON-
TRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND A BREACH 
OF THE SAID CONTRACT, THE PLAINTIFF 
SHOWED NO DAMAGES FOR SUCH BREACH, AND 
THERE IS NO GROUND SHOWN FOR THE FOR-
FEITURE OF $500.00 AS LIQUIDATED DAMAGES 
THEREFOR. 
The judgment of the District Court is for forfeiture of 
$500.00 as liquidated damages for the nonperformance of 
an alleged contract by the defendant. There is no evide.nce 
before the court of any actual damage suffered by the 
plaintiff for the breach of the alle,ged contract. 
It is well established in the law of our state that where 
parties to a contract stipulate the amount of liquidated 
damages that shall be paid in case of a breach, such stipu-
lation and contract is not enforceable if the amount of the 
forfeiture is disproportionate to the amount of damages 
actually suffered by the claiming party. This rule is an-
nounced and illustrated in a long and consiste.nt line pf 
cases including PERKINS VS. SPENCER, 121 U. 468, 
243 Pac. 2nd 446; YOUNG VS. HANSEN, 117 U. 591, 
218 Pac. 2nd 666; CROFT VS. JENSEN, 86 UTAH 13; 
40 Pac. 2nd 198; MALMBERG VS. BAUGH, 62 Utah 331, 
218 Pac. 975; WESTERN MACARONI MANUFA,CTUR-
ING COMPANY VS. FIORE, 47 Utah 108, 151 Pac. 984; 
and MciNTOSH VS. JOHNSON, 8 Utah, 359; 31 Pac. 450. 
In the present case, there is no evidence before the 
court which would indicate that the plaintiff has suffered 
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any damage at all. If it has sold the automobile. which it 
claimed to have sold to the defendant, then it is difficult 
to see wherein its damage lies. The defendant has intro-
duced as an exhibit an application for certificate of title 
upon the automobile which has been signed in blank by 
the defendant but which has obviously never been filled 
out and presented to the Tax Commission (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 4) It would appear, therefore, that the plain-
tiff has made no effort to actually transfer title to the 
au.omobile to the defendant. The rule illustrated by the 
above-quoted cases is founded on sound principle of equity 
that a forfeiture which is disproportionate to actual dam-
ages is, in effect, a penalty and would result in the unjust 
enrichment of the person receiving the same. Neither the 
facts before the court nor the plaintiff's memorandum shows 
anything which would justify a forfeiture in this case. 
In the case of Jensen's Used Cars vs. Rich, Supra, the 
Supreme Court upheld a forfeiture of $200.00 upon a used 
car which the defendant had held and used for some 
thre.e months after a contract was signed between the parties. 
Obviously, this case cannot be taken as authority for the. 
plaintiff's position that it should receive a forfeiture of 
$500.00 where the defendant never accepted nor received 
the automobile and where the plaintiff retained the exclu-
sive possession, title and right to the disposition of the 
automobile. 
CONCLUSION 
The holding of the District Court in the present case 
is of grave concern to this appellant because it appears to 
be contrary to all of the fundamental and accepted rules 
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of law. If upheld, this de.cision would extend the sound 
principle announced in the case of 1 ensen's Used Cars vs. 
Rich, Supra, to include a case such as the present one 
where an automobile dealer, simply by changing the terms 
of a contract over the other party's signature, may impose 
upon such party whatever terms he might choose. The 
evidence he.re is clear that while the changes were made 
in Jackson's presence, they were made unilate.rally without 
his consent and even over his protests and objections. Cer-
tainly a person who signs a form should not, by that fact, 
become the unwilling victim of the other party's greed and 
caprice. 
The appellant knows of no case under the laws of the 
State of Utah, or elsewhere, under which the decision can 
be justified. Certainly, the 1 ensen case is distinguishable 
upon the fact and law. An extension of the ruling in that 
case to cover the present circumstances would appear to 
place automobile dealers in a preferred class under the law, 
in that thy are not subject to the ordinary and accepted 
laws concerning the formation of contracts. 
Upon the basis of the foregoing the appellant submits 
that the decision of the District Court in the instant case 
should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BEN G. BAGLEY 
Attorney for Defendant 
and App.ellant 
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